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This paper investigates the impact of growth opportunities on the interpretation of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of large Belgian companies. We use data on long 
time listed firms, recent IPO firms and large unlisted firms to incorporate a wide 
variation  in  information  asymmetry.  Our  results  reveal  that  when  information 
asymmetry is high, decreasing cash flow sensitivity as growth prospects improve is 
not necessarily caused by agency costs of free cash flow. Rather, it may indicate that 
capital constrained firms increase the use of external financing in high growth periods 
as these financing sources then tend to become more appealing. 
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1. Introduction 
In  perfect  capital  markets,  investment  decisions  are  driven  by  investment 
opportunities while the financing choice is irrelevant. However, the literature shows 
that investment decisions may be distorted, either by capital constraints (e.g., Fazzari 
et al., 1988, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1984; Hubbard, 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002a) or by misalignment between managerial and minority shareholder interest in 
public firms (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Deloof, 1998; Richardson, 2006; Degryse and de 
Jong, 2006). Both effects cause cash flow sensitivity of investment. Likely the most 
important variable used in the literature to disentangle both sources of sensitivity is 
growth opportunities (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1991; Vogt, 1994; Audretsch and Weigand, 
2005; Degryse and de Jong, 2006; among others). Specifically, when firms suffer 
from financial constraints, growth prospects are expected to cause increases in cash 
flow sensitivity and under investment. By contrast, as improving growth opportunities 
help to resolve over spending problems, cash flow sensitivity should decrease with 
growth if it results from agency issues 
Preceding logic as well as most empirical evidence on the relationship between 
growth opportunities and cash flow sensitivity is based on a perspective of established 
long time listed firms that can relatively easily tap external capital markets. However, 
in  practice most firms suffer from severe asymmetric  information  problems, be  it 
because they have only recently been listed through IPO or more importantly because 
they are unlisted (Holod and Peek, 2007; Giannetti, 2003).
1 Novel to the literature we 
show  that  the  relationship  between  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  and  growth 
                                                
1  La Porta et al. (1999), Giannetti (2003), among others  claim that  quoted companies are not the 
dominant corporate form and often represent only a minor share of a countries’ GDP. Claessens and 
Tzioumis (2006) report that in their sample, covering large companies in 19 European countries with 
size well above the listing requirements of European stock exchanges, only about 13% of firms are 
listed.   3 
opportunities  changes  depending  upon  the  degree  of  asymmetric  information.
2 
Additionally, we show why growth prospects need not increase but rather decrease 
capital constraints in firms suffering from severe asymmetric information. As a third 
contribution, this paper is one of the first to document how corporate  investment 
policy  differs  between  comparable  firms  functioning  in  the  same  institutional 
environment except for their access to the capital market, as our sample includes long 
time  listed  companies,  recent  IPOs  and  large  unlisted  firms.  Fourth,  our  sample 
contains firms that change their public status between unlisted and listed during the 
sample  period  which  enables  us  to  control  for  possible  biases  caused  by  the 
endogeneity of the public/private status. 
Our sample comprises all Belgian non financial firms filing consolidated accounts 
over the period 1992-2003. Using data from a single country has the advantage that 
we  do  not  have  to  control  for  potentially  many  differences  in  institutional 
environment. In fact, Belgium – being a typical continental European country where 
the  bulk  of  large  (consolidating)  companies  remain  unlisted  and  listed  firms  are 
predominantly controlled by large shareholders - is an interesting environment to test 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. In particular, as Belgian listed firms typically have a 
dominant  shareholder,  there  is  little  need  to  control  for  important  differences  in 
governance. The same holds true for our sample of unlisted firms, where roughly 80% 
is controlled by one shareholder or family.
3 
                                                
2 Several authors also introduce the notion of time varying cash flow sensitivity by evaluating the 
symptoms of financing constraints as a function of macro-economic variables. Almeida et al. (2004) 
for  example  take  into  account the  changes  in corporate liquidity  demand  over  the business cycle. 
Others like Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) and Audretsch and Elston (2002), take into account the 
notion  that capital  market imperfections  are  not  stable  over  time,  leading  to  changes in financing 
constraints as a function of macro-economic fluctuations. 
3 Because the bulk of unlisted firms have one shareholder, most of these companies cannot suffer from 
conflicts among large shareholders either. Deleting the 20% unlisted companies with more than one 
owner, has no effect on our main findings.   4 
Our research only considers firms that publish consolidated accounts, listed as 
well as unlisted. In Belgium, listed firms always have to file such accounts, while 
unlisted companies are only subject to this requirement once they are of sufficient size 
and have no (consolidating) parent.
4 These latter size criteria are substantially higher 
than those used as minimal listing requirements on European stock exchanges. As a 
result, the size of many Belgian listed and unlisted consolidating firms is comparable. 
In addition, consolidating private firms are subject to the same accounting rules and 
mandatory publication format of financial statements as the listed ones. Furthermore, 
analogous to public companies, the accounts of private companies also need approval 
of a certified accountant. Consequently, the accounting data are likely to be both of 
high quality and easily comparable across our sample firms. 
Previewing our results, we find – in line with other studies – that recent IPO firms 
invest  more  than  long  time  listed  firms,  while  investment  ratios  of  the  latter  are 
similar  to  those  of  the  unlisted  companies  over  the  sample  period.
5  Furthermore, 
investment  by  long  time  listed  firms  is  little  cash  flow  sensitive  while  unlisted 
companies and recent IPOs show important levels of investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
However, contrary to empirical studies on samples mainly limited to long time listed 
firms,  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  of  IPOs  and  unlisted  firms  in  our  sample 
proves  to  decrease  significantly  during  periods  of  high  growth  opportunities.  We 
show that this phenomenon can be explained by the timing of the acquisition of extra 
external financing. By contrast, for long time listed firms the acquisition of external 
                                                
4  The  size  requirements  for  consolidation  are  discussed  in  our  sample  description.  Consolidated 
accounts have the additional advantage that they help us to overcome possible distortions due to the 
presence of some pyramidal ownership in the sample. 
5 This suggests that, consistent with empirical observation in many parts of the world, a stock listing is 
not necessarily a natural phase in the life cycle of a company, as remaining unlisted can be a viable 
strategic choice. In fact, Boot et al. (2006) analyze theoretically the firm’s choice between private and 
public ownership. They show that managers need decision making autonomy to optimally manage the 
firm  and  thus  trade  off  an  endogenized  control  preference  against  the  higher  cost  of  capital 
accompanying greater managerial autonomy.   5 
financing does not result in a drop in cash flow sensitivity. Additional robustness 
checks based on the methodology of Almeida en Campello (2005) show that for the 
long  time  listed  companies  as  well  as  the  recent  IPOs  in  our  sample  there  is  a 
significant substitution effect between internal and external financing. For unlisted 
companies this is only the case in periods of high growth, which supports our timing 
arguments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an 
overview  of  the  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  literature  and  construct  our 
hypotheses  concerning  the  impact  of  information  asymmetry  and  financing 
opportunities  on  investment  policy.  Section  3  contains  the  sample  description, 
variable measurement and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, 
while Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Investment-Cash flow Sensitivity: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Following,  the  seminal  work  of  Fazzari  et  al.  (1988),  many  researchers  have 
studied the investment-cash flow sensitivity (mainly) for publicly quoted companies 
by distinguishing firms on the basis of a priori indicators of financing constraints. The 
conflicting results generated by this methodology have, however, been criticized (e.g., 
Kaplan  and  Zingales,  1997,  2000;  Cleary,  1999;  Moyen,  2004;  Allayannis  and 
Mozumdar, 2004; Almeida et al., 2004; among others). 
Recent studies try to gain a better understanding of these empirical findings by 
focusing on the causes of cash flow sensitivity (e.g., Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; 
Degryse and de Jong, 2006; among others). In particular, the asymmetric information 
problem  of  Myers  and  Majluf  (1984)  suggests  that  firms  may  suffer  from  under 
investment  when  the  acquisition  of  external  financing  is  costly.  In  that  case,   6 
investment outlays will depend on the availability of internally generated resources, 
resulting  in  positive  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity.  Not  only  extra  equity  may 
become  excessively  costly,  but  information  asymmetry  may  also  hamper  firms in 
obtaining additional debt (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald et al., 1984). Watson 
and Wilson (2002) show that a financial pecking order among will be most apparent 
when information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is greater, leading to 
higher  costs  associated  with  external  financing.  As  this  problem  increases  with 
investment opportunities, it is typically argued that cash flow sensitivity should be 
higher for firms with high investment opportunities (Fazzari et al., 1988). Next to 
asymmetric information, firms are also affected by the agency problem of free cash 
flow. At least in the case of listed firms, where management and ownership tends to 
be separated, over investment of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) can cause a positive 
relationship between cash flow and investment. This problem is likely worse for firms 
with little investment opportunities.
6 
Following Hoshi et al. (1991) and Vogt (1994), the different response of cash flow 
sensitivity to changing investment opportunities (or growth opportunities), has been 
used  to  disentangle  over-and  under-investment  issues.  High  growth  opportunities 
combined with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity is believed to be a symptom of 
under investment (e.g., Audretsch and Elston, 2002; Bond et al., 2003; Audretsch and 
Weigand, 2005; among others), while a decrease in cash flow sensitivity should point 
to  problems  of  free  cash  flow  (e.g.,  Deloof,  1998;  Gugler,  2003;  among  others). 
                                                
6 Del Brio et al. (2003) show for example on Spanish data that the level of free cash flow as well as the 
investment opportunities influences the market reaction to investment announcements.   7 
Several authors find a combination of both effects (e.g., Degryse and de Jong, 2006; 
Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; among others).
7 
 
Preceding  logic  does  not  take  into  account  that  growth  opportunities  may  be 
correlated with an increased use of external financing. The reason for this is that most 
studies concentrate on mainly long time publicly traded firms, which - a priori - are 
less  influenced  by  information-related  financial  market  imperfections.  Holod  and 
Peek (2007) show however, using data on listed as well as unlisted banks, that access 
to external financing is influenced by the degree of information asymmetry associated 
with the listing status, especially in periods of monetary tightening. When information 
asymmetries are important, the gap between the cost of internal and external financing 
becomes substantial. One would then expect that firm characteristics affecting this 
gap  -  like  growth  opportunities  –  will  influence  the  firm’s  access  to  external 
financing. This occurs for example when, in periods of high growth, the benefits from 
investment  opportunities  overcome  the  costs  of  external  financing  and/or  external 
financing costs are smaller compared to low growth periods. We argue below that the 
timing  of  the  acquisition  of  external  financing  is  likely  to  significantly  distort 
measured  investment-cash  flow  sensitivities  for  firms  suffering  from  important 
information  asymmetries.  When  information  asymmetry  is  limited,  the  cost  gap 
between  internal  and  external  financing  is  relatively  small  and  the  availability  of 
external financing is therefore less likely to influence investment behavior. 
                                                
7 For completeness it should be mentioned that, without focusing on the over – vs. under investment 
debate, some studies investigate the impact  on cash flow sensitivity of  ownership and governance 
characteristics (Hoshi et al. 1991; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000), 
banking relationships (Houston and James, 2001; Aivazian et al., 2005) or institutional factors (Bond et 
al., 2003). Most of these studies find important differences in cash flow sensitivity, suggesting that firm 
characteristics  like  group membership  or  country  specific  institutional  characteristics  may  have  an 
impact on a firm’s investment/financing behavior.   8 
In particular, consistent with arguments and empirical evidence in Hovakimian 
and Hovakimian (2007), Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Hennessy and Whited (2005), 
companies suffering from severe information asymmetry, may be forced to postpone 
investment to periods when additional financing is available at reasonable cost. If this 
“suboptimal”  timing  in  investment  is  not  too  costly  –  e.g.,  in  terms  of  foregone 
product market opportunities – this behavior might even trigger significant net cost 
savings by attracting external resources during low cost financing windows. Since –in 
view of the information problems– debt financing will be easier to attract compared to 
equity, available external financing resources for the most constrained subsample are 
likely to consist of interest bearing debt (Watson and Wilson, 2002; Hall et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, lenders typically improve their evaluation of borrowers when the latter 
can show that their prospects ameliorate. In fact, Altman and Narayanan (1997) claim 
that banks make extensive use of growth measures in order to classify companies as 
financially sound. Simultaneously, following Berger and Udell (1998), and consistent 
with  the  evidence  in  Korajczyk  and  Levy  (2003)  one  can  argue  that,  as  owners 
observe that the debt carrying capacity of their firm improves, they may also prefer 
more  debt  financing  in  high  growth  periods.  When  information-related  financial 
market  imperfections  diminish,  opportunities  to  continuously  attract  external 
financing at lower costs improve, both in debt and equity markets, while internal and 
external financing become better substitutes. As a result, cash flow sensitivity due to 
capital constraints should be limited. Furthermore, although there is ample evidence 
that  long  time  listed  firms  also  time  the  acquisition  of  external  financing  (e.g., 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Pastor and Veronesi, 2005; among others), due to the 
substitutability of external and internal resources, the impact of an increased use of   9 
external  resources  on  measured  cash  flow  sensitivity  should  be  limited  for  these 
firms.
8 
In sum, we expect firms  suffering from important information asymmetries to 
show higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. In periods of high growth opportunities 
however, this cash flow sensitivity is lower compared to low growth years due to the 
impact  of  increased  external  financing.  For  firms  with  low  levels  of  information 
asymmetry the impact of external financing on measured cash flow sensitivity should 
be smaller. 
 
3. Sample, Variable Measurement and Univariate Statistics 
 
3.1 Sample Description 
Our  sample  covers  the  12  years  1992-2003,  and  initially  consists  of  all 
consolidated financial statements of Belgian firms. These data were gathered from the 
NBB  (National  Bank  of  Belgium)  and  the  Belfirst  database  (Bureau  Van  Dijk). 
Issuing consolidated statements only became mandatory in 1992, and then only for 
firms of sufficient size.
9 As mentioned before, these thresholds are significantly above 
the minimal size requirements for listing on European stock exchanges.
10 Contrary to 
unlisted  firms,  listed  companies  are  obliged  to  publish  consolidated  statements, 
irrespective of size. As within our ultimate sample only 7 firms publish consolidated 
                                                
8 Preceding logic suggests that for low levels of information asymmetry the distortion of measured 
investment-cash flow sensitivity from timing external financing is limited. Hence in samples (mainly) 
consisting of long time listed companies –as is the case in most empirical studies– decreasing cash flow 
sensitivity with increasing growth opportunities most likely indicates agency costs of free cash flow. 
9 Filing consolidated accounts becomes obligatory when 2 out of the following 3 size thresholds are 
exceeded: turnover over 50 million euros, total assets over 25 million euros and the company employs 
more than 500 workers. From the year 2000 on, these criteria where relaxed to 25 million; 12.5 million 
and 250 respectively. 
10 NYSE-Euronext, the largest exchange in Europe, generally proposes an equity book value of above 
1.5 million euros as a minimum listing (size) requirement.   10 
accounts  because  the  latter  obligation  is  binding,  the  impact  of  this  difference  in 
treatment is limited.
11 
We further exclude all financial firms as well as all companies that are either state 
owned  or  mere  production  entities  from  a  large  international  parent.  In  order  to 
identify  the  latter  companies  we  used  ownership  data  from  either  the  Amadeus 
database (Bureau Van Dijk) or from the firms’ websites. To minimize the influence of 
outliers in our analysis, we replace extreme observations of all ratio variables with 
missing values. Extreme observations include values in the 99
th percentile and, for 
variables with negative values, also those in the 1
st percentile.
12 
Because  of  the  presence  of  pyramidal  structures,  the  status  of  being  unlisted 
requires  special  attention.  Specifically,  we  exclude  unlisted  companies  that  either 
have a publicly quoted parent or subsidiary. Furthermore, subsidiaries from parents 
that  have  to  issue  consolidated  accounts  do  not  need  to  issue  these  consolidated 
statements themselves, except for publicly quoted firms that always have to publish 
such accounts. Nevertheless within our sample 66 unlisted firms that satisfy the size 
requirements but have a consolidating parent, voluntarily consolidate. We leave these 
firms  in  our  sample  but  perform  robustness checks  on  possible  biases created  by 
voluntary disclosure by re-estimating our equations without these firms. Results are 
robust. 
As we wish to avoid selection biases, it is important that companies can enter or 
leave during the sample period. The most important reason for entering the sample is 
data  availability  or  meeting  the  size  requirements  for  consolidation.  Exiting  the 
sample prematurely is either caused by bankruptcy (17 firms), takeover (14 firms), no 
                                                
11 Our results are robust for deleting these firms. 
12 Results are similar if, instead of trimming, variables are winsorized at 1 percent.   11 
longer meeting size requirements (10 firms) or the fact that the accounting data was 
not available at the time of sample construction.  
Finally,  our  sample also  includes  firms  that change  their  public/private status. 
Within  our  sample  period,  40  companies  went  public  but  only  for  13  of  them 
consolidated accounts are available for the years preceding IPO. For the 6 firms with 
a going private transaction during the sample period, no consolidated accounting data 




INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Table  1  Panel  A  represents  the  sample  composition  over  the  different  years. 
Overall  our  sample  consists  of  2040  firm  year  observations  for  which  1472 
correspond  to unlisted and 567  to listed  companies.  Panel B of Table 1 gives an 
overview of the industry distribution. Manufacturing includes the largest number of 
firms (133), followed by services (121) and distribution (78). This distribution over 
sectors is quite representative for the Belgian economy as a whole. 
 
3.2 Variable Measurement and Methodology 
A wide range of models has been used to test investment-cash flow sensitivity. A 
baseline  investment  model  typically  consists  of  a  measure  of  internally  generated 
funds  and  investment  opportunities.  We  use  the  following  standard  specification, 
analogue  to  Audretsch  and  Weigand  (2005),  which  has  been  augmented  with  the 
variables of interest for our study: 
                                                
13 Overall our sample includes 326 companies for which we have consolidated statements covering 
only unlisted years, 86 firms covering only listed years and 13 firms for which the sample includes 
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D
b + m + a =
- -
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   (1) 
 
In equation (1), Iit stands for gross investment defined as the change in the real 
capital stock (K) plus depreciation. Capital stock (K) is proxied by tangible fixed 
assets. The parameter αi represents an unobservable firm level fixed effect while mt is 
used to control for fixed time effects.
 14  S represents the growth of real sales. As a 
measure of internally generated funds we use a measure of real cash flow (CF). In line 
with Bhagat et al. (2005) and Lins et al. (2005) we take into account that some of the 
internally  generated  funds  are  committed  to  debtors  (via  interests)  or  to  the 
government  (through  taxes).  Therefore  we  start  out  from  EBITDA  and  subtract 
interests and taxes to arrive at our cash flow measure. All variables are normalized by 
the capital stock at the beginning of the period. In order to correct for relative price 
differences over the years, we deflate all nominal values with the consumer price 
index. 
Due to the unavailability of a market price for unlisted firms, we use sales growth 
instead of Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities. This approach is also 
applied by Konings et al. (2003) and Audretsch and Weigand (2005), among others. 
However, just as Tobin’s Q, this measure may not sufficiently capture investment 
opportunities. As a result some of this information may also be captured by cash flow. 
                                                
14 In our basic analysis we do not include industry effects as they can be considered to be subsumed by 
the individual fixed firm effects implied by the differencing in the Arellano and Bond methodology. 
We checked for the robustness of our results by including industry dummies to capture consistent 
heterogeneity  in investment policy across different industries. Results are  very  similar to the  ones 
reported and are available upon request.   13 
In order to identify the liquidity role of cash flow, we augment our investment model 
by the change in net working capital relative to the real capital stock (∆WC/K), an 
approach also used by  Audretsch and Weigand  (2005) and Degryse  and De  Jong 
(2006). Fazzari and Petersen (1993) point out that a firm confronted with financing 
constraints typically adjusts net working capital to smooth investment relative to cash 
flow shocks. A constrained firm is expected to show a negative relationship between 
investment and the change in net working capital. By contrast, if cash flow signals 
investment  opportunities  rather  than  liquidity,  we  should  observe  a  positive 
coefficient for the change in net working capital in the investment equation. 
As an indicator of access to external financing we use, analogue to Baker et al. 
(2003), the relative change in (interest bearing) debt plus equity, measured by paid in 
capital (∆EF/K). As an alternative measure of this external financing ratio, we also 
use  a  bank  debt  ratio  (∆BD/K)  measured  by  the  relative  change  in  total  bank 
debt.
15,16,17 The models including a bank debt ratio instead of an external financing 
ratio  are  considered  because  the  composition  of  the  additional  external  financing 
resources may be very different between unlisted and listed firms. Finally, we include 
a  size  variable  (Lnta)  measured  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  at  the 
beginning of the period. The literature (e.g., Audretsch and Elston, 2002) commonly 
uses size as a proxy for the firm’s capacity to access external financing. As we want 
to make sure that our findings concerning differences in investment behavior between 
                                                
15 We do not include trade credit because it is highly correlated with sales. Within our sample of large 
and  well  established  firms  this  is  not  surprising,  as  it  are  mainly  small  entrepreneurial  firms  that 
actively use trade credit as a substitute for bank debt.  
16 Another source of external debt is bonds. However few firms use it. In fact the median value is 0 and 
the average amount used as a percentage of total assets is 0,4% and 1,6% for unlisted and listed firms 
respectively. Other small (on average and in median terms) debt entries include other financial debts, 
subordinated debt, leasing, prepayments received, social security and taxes, accruals. 
17As a robustness check we replaced total bank debt and equity (i.e. a measure of both long and short 
term external finance) with short term bank debt (i.e. a measure of short term external finance).  We 
also split up total bank debt into short term and long term bank debt. We finally also replaced total 
bank debt with total debt. Our main findings remain robust.   14 
subgroups of firms are not distorted by size differences, we explicitly account for 
company  size  in  our  investment  models.  A  formal  definition  of  our  variables  is 
provided in appendix. 
We  compare  differences  in  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  between  unlisted, 
recent IPO firms and long time listed companies. The extensive literature on corporate 
governance and on initial public offerings indicates that unlisted companies suffer 
significantly  more  from  asymmetric  information  problems  and  capital  market 
imperfections  as  compared  to  their  listed  counterparts  (e.g.,  Allen,  1993;  Jensen, 
1989;  Pagano  et  al.,  1998;  Faure-Grimaud  and  Gromb,  2004;  among  others). 
Simultaneously as they have no small outside shareholders, cash flow sensitivity in 
unlisted firms  is  expected  to  reflect  capital  constraints  rather  then  free  cash  flow 
problems.  
Furthermore, although an IPO reduces capital market imperfections a firm faces 
(e.g., Kim, 1999; Mahérault, 2000; among others) recent IPO-companies still suffer 
more from asymmetric information problems as compared to long time listed firms 
(Degryse and de Jong, 2006). To distinguish between these groups of firms, we split 
the subsample of listed companies in a long time listed and a recent IPO subgroup. 
We introduce two stock listing dummy variables LnonIPOit and LIPOit as well as 
interactions of these dummies with the cash flow ratio in the investment equation. 
LnonIPOit takes the value 1 if firm i was listed in year t but did not go public 3 years 
or less prior to t, otherwise LnonIPOit is 0. Similarly, when a company i was listed in 
year t and went public 3 years or less prior to t, it is classified as a recent IPO and 
LIPOit = 1; otherwise LIPOit = 0. Note that companies can shift from unlisted to 
recent IPO and, eventually, even to the long time listed subgroup during our sample 
period.   15 
In  equation  (1)  we  use  interaction  terms  instead  of  split  samples  because  we 
control  for  the  endogeneity  of  the  public/private  status  as  well  as  the  other 
explanatory variables by using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM methodology. In 
fact, recent literature has pointed out the endogeneity problems that accompany cash 
flow  sensitivity  research.  Gugler  (2003),  Konings  et  al.  (2003),  Schiantarelli  and 
Semnenelli (2000) among others argue that GMM estimators that control for possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables, avoid most of the problems with traditional 
investment models based on OLS estimation. Nevertheless, we also perform extra 
robustness  checks  on  distortions  due  to  the  likely  simultaneity  of  investment  and 
financing decisions later on. 
In a further stage we also introduce additional interaction terms within the subsets 
unlisted firms, long time listed firms and recent IPOs to separate out the impact of 
high and low levels of growth opportunities. To that end we construct a sales growth 
dummy (SG) that is assigned the value 1 if the sales growth ratio of a company during 
a certain year is higher than the subsample’s (unlisted, long time listed or recent IPO) 
median  over the sample  period. Notice that each firm’s  growth dummy (SG)  can 
change  over  the  sample  period,  so  that  firms may  be  reclassified as their  growth 
opportunities alter. This approach differs from some other authors (e.g., Degryse and 
de Jong, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; among others) who classify companies 
into high and low opportunity subgroups rather than identifying changes within a 
firm’s  opportunities  over  the  sample  period.  By  allowing  the  composition  of 
subgroups to vary over time, our approach enables us to evaluate adjustments in firm 
specific investment policy as opportunities change.
18 
                                                
18 Allowing for such changes is useful. By estimating investment equations by year, Audretsch and 
Elston (2002) show that the degree of financing constraints indeed changes over time. Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli (2000) introduce a firm specific business cycle indicator by allowing cash flow sensitivity 
to change between years of increasing or decreasing cash flow levels.   16 
3.3 Univariate Statistics 
Table 2 contains summary statistics (Panel A) and univariate tests (Panel B) for 
the variables used in our (reported) models. We split up the full sample (Column 1) in 
the three relevant subgroups; unlisted (2), long time listed firms (3) and recent IPO 
firms (4). Although long time listed companies show on average higher investment 
ratios (I/K) than their unlisted peers, the difference is not significant. By contrast, 
recent IPO firms invest significantly more than other companies. This latter finding is 
consistent  with  Carpenter  and  Petersen  (2002b)  who  report  that  publicly  quoted 
companies  use  the  capital  market  as  an  active  source  of  investment  financing 
predominantly in the first years after listing. The sales growth ratio ( S/K) indicates 
that  long  time  listed  companies  grow  somewhat  faster  over  the  sample  period, 
although the difference with the group of unlisted firms is not significant. Recent IPO 
firms however, have a significantly larger growth rate. A similar picture arises for the 
cash  flow  ratio  (CF/K).  The  fact  that  long  time  listed  firms  are  able  to  maintain 
somewhat higher investment levels with comparable fund generation, may be a first 
indication  that  they  are  less  financially  constrained  than  unlisted  companies. 
However, as compared to the other firms in our sample, recent IPOs benefit from 
significantly more internal fund generation. The variable measuring the change in 
working capital ( WC/K) shows no significant difference between the three groups of 
firms. Although the change in bank debt ( BD/K) differs significantly between long 
time listed and unlisted companies in median terms, the difference is economically 
small. Within the publicly quoted companies no significant difference can be found 
between recent IPO firms and the other listed companies on this score. When we look 
at the total change of external financing ( EF/K) however, recent IPO firms differ 
significantly. In line with the findings in the literature (e.g., Baker et al., 2003 and   17 
Carpenter  and  Petersen,  2002b),  IPO  firms  prove  to  make  more  use  of  the  stock 
market in financing their investment needs. Finally, the univariate statistics for the 
size  variable  (Lnta)  show  that  in  our  sample  long  time  listed  companies  are 
significantly larger than both recent IPO firms and unlisted companies, in mean as 





INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Panel B of Table 2 splits up the subsamples even further in low and high growth 
years based on the SG dummy variable as defined in Section 3.2. Two important 
results should be noted in this Panel. First, differences in investment ratios are never 
significant between unlisted and long time listed companies although they are always 
somewhat  higher  for  the  latter.  Recent  IPO  firms  however,  seem  to  invest 
significantly more but mainly in high growth years. Second, differences in the change 
in  the  bank  debt  ratio  as  well  as  the  external  financing  ratio  between  subgroups 
depend strongly on the level of growth opportunities. It is interesting to note that, 
while  in  low  growth  years,  the  relative  change  in  external  financing  differs 
significantly  between  long  time  listed  and  unlisted  companies,  this  difference 
disappears when growth opportunities are high. In the latter case however, recent IPO 
firms differ drastically from the long time listed companies. In sum, we find that only 
in  high  growth  periods  unlisted companies seem able to  attract levels of  external 
financing similar to those of long time listed companies. In Contrast, recent IPO firms 
                                                
19  The  fact  that  our  unlisted  firms  are  not  much  smaller  than  our  listed  companies  need  not  be 
surprising  since our unlisted sample companies are well established. Although the listed firms are 
older,  on  average,  the  average  age  of  both  our  listed  and  unlisted  sample  firms  amounts  to  51 
respectively 34 years.   18 
differentiate  themselves  from  the  long  time  listed  companies  specifically  in  high 
growth periods. 
Preceding numbers only reflect a general tendency covering the whole 12 year 
sample  period.  Important  differences  within  the  sample,  both  between  years  and 
individual firms may occur. A first indication of this is given by Figure 1. 
 
***************************** 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Figure 1 shows the yearly average (median) investment ratio for the long time 
listed companies, recent IPO firms and the unlisted subgroup. It reveals that, while 
investment spending of long time listed and IPO companies follows a more volatile 
and  cyclical  pattern,  the  investment  rate  of  unlisted  firms  is  much  smoother.  In 
particular, when listed companies show very high levels of investment expenditure, 
the unlisted firms seem to follow more slowly and remain at lower levels. Conversely, 
decreases in investments are also less pronounced, so that in some years unlisted firms 
invest even more than the long time listed companies. In the following section we 
look into the forces shaping these investment patterns. 
 
4. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in Different Information Environments 
In the first Section (4.1) we consider the model (1) from Section 3. In Section 4.2 
we analyze how growth opportunities affect investment-cash flow sensitivity and how 
this may be influenced by external financing opportunities. Finally, in Section 4.3 we 
perform some robustness checks. 
   19 
4.1 The Investment Rate and Cash Flow Sensitivity 
The regression results for our investment equation (1) are reported in Table 3. 
Panels A and B use the change in total external financing or the change in bank debt 
respectively. As mentioned above, models are tested with GMM estimators in first 
differences using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method. The validity of using lagged 
values of both the dependent variable and the endogenous regressors as instruments
20 
was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of 
serial correlation in the residuals. The validity of instruments was never rejected.
21,22 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
In  line  with  results  from  earlier  studies,  the estimated coefficient  of  the  sales 
growth ratio ( S/K) - which controls for growth opportunities - is positive in both 
panels.  The  significantly  negative  coefficient  of  the  change  in  working  capital 
( WC/K), suggests that the cash flow ratio does not capture opportunities but rather 
liquidity from internally generated funds. Also our control variable for size (Lnta) is 
positive and significant over all models, indicating that all else being equal, larger 
companies are able to invest more. Panels A and B of Table 3 show that the change in 
external finance ( EF/K) as well as the change in total bank debt ( BD/K) has a 
positive  impact  on  the  investment  ratio.  Furthermore,  the  dummy  coefficients  for 
stock listing are only significant for recent IPO firms (LIPO). This indicates – in line 
                                                
20 The instruments we use are I/Ki,t-j for j >= 2, and second lags of all other explanatory variables.  
21 The M1 and M2 tests, reported in the respective tables, suggest that the error term has a moving 
average  structure  of  order  one  (significant  first  order  correlation  but  non  significant  second  order 
correlation),  as  one would expect  in  the  differenced form  of  the  equation,  when  the  idiosyncratic 
component of the error term in the level equation is serially uncorrelated. Both tests together with the 
Sargan test suggest that variables lagged twice or more are legitimate instruments. 
22 In order to check the sensitivity of our results, we exclude the observations with negative investment 
ratios from our sample (as in Konings et al., 2003). Negative investment ratios may be an indication of 
distress, or at least of downsizing or restructuring. This behavior is not necessarily related to growth 
opportunities and might distort our overall findings. Results are very comparable to the ones reported.   20 
with our univariate statistics - that, controlling for growth opportunities, financing 
sources and size, only recent IPO firms invest significantly more as compared to their 
unlisted peers. 
Turning to the investment-cash flow sensitivity, Table 3 shows that the coefficient 
for cash flow CF/K (0.7150 in Panel A and 0.6390 in Panel B) is large and significant, 
indicating that for unlisted firms investment expenditures are strongly dependent on 
internally  generated  funds.  For  listed  companies  the  situation  is  different.  The 
interaction terms of cash flow sensitivity with LnonIPO and with LIPO - that capture 
the extra effect relative to unlisted firms - imply that investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is significantly lower in publicly quoted companies. For recent IPO firms however the 
reduction in cash flow sensitivity is somewhat smaller compared to long time listed 
companies. We also evaluate the significance of the net effect of cash flow sensitivity 
for publicly quoted companies by applying a Wald coefficient test to the form (CF/K 
+  LnonIPO*CF/K  = 0)  and analogous for  LIPO. The results from these tests are 
reported at the bottom of the Table.
23 The net effect coefficient of the cash flow ratio 
for long time listed firms is insignificant in both Panels A and B. These results are 
comparable to the findings of Bond et al. (2003) who also find little investment-cash 
flow  sensitivity  for  Belgian,  German  and  French  listed  companies.
24  By  contrast, 
similar to Degryse and de Jong (2006), for recent IPO firms (LIPO) we still find a 
significant level of investment-cash flow sensitivity (0.5433 in Panel A and 0.2941 in 
Panel  B).  While  for  the  unlisted  subgroup,  where  small  public  shareholders  are 
                                                
23 A similar approach is used by Audretsch and Weigand (2005).  
24 Deloof (1998)  finds positive  investment-cash flow  sensitivity  on  a  small  set  of  Belgian  quoted 
companies for the 1981-1991 sample period using OLS. The cash flow sensitivity was however only 
significant for companies without an active internal capital market. The fact that, overall, research only 
reports limited cash flow sensitivity for long time listed Belgian firms may not be surprising. For these 
latter mature companies are unlikely to suffer much from capital constraints. Furthermore, in view of 
the presence of large owners, and the fact that in publicly quoted Belgian firms – as in most Western 
European  countries  -  there  is  a  reasonably  good  protection  of  small  outside  shareholders,  agency 
problems likely are kept in check.    21 
absent, it is hard to attribute the positive investment-cash flow sensitivity to agency 
costs,  we can not  off hand  draw the same conclusions for our results concerning 
recent IPO firms. In the latter companies, cash flow sensitivity could also indicate free 
cash flow problems caused by the conflict of interest between insiders  and small 
outside shareholders. We address this issue further in a robustness check later on. 
 
4.2. Cash Flow Sensitivity, Growth and Financing Opportunities 
In Table 4 we investigate the impact of differences in growth opportunities by 
allowing  the  cash  flow  coefficient  to  change  depending  on  whether  the  company 
experiences  high  or  low  sales  growth  relative  to  other  firms  in  its  subgroup.  As 
before,  Panel  A  reports  results  for  the  model  using  the  change  in  total  external 
financing  ( EF/K)  while Panel  B shows results for the model including only  the 
change in bank debt ( BD/K). As explained in the previous section, we construct a 
sales growth dummy (SG) that is assigned the value 1 if sales growth of a company 
during a certain year is higher than its subsample’s (unlisted, long time listed or recent 
IPO) median over the sample period. Next, we split up the cash flow coefficient of 
both unlisted and listed firms by interacting it with (1-SG) and SG. The variable (1-
SG)*CF/K then represents the cash flow ratio of unlisted firms in years of low growth 
opportunities, while SG*CF/K covers this ratio in high growth years. The variables 
LnonIPO*(1-SG)*CF/K  or  LIPO*(1-SG)*CF/K  and  LnonIPO*SG*CF/K  or 
LIPO*SG*CF/K measure the extra effect on cash flow sensitivity in long time listed 
and recent IPO firms relative to unlisted companies. 
***************************** 
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****************************** 
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Looking at unlisted companies first, Panel A as well as Panel B show that the split 
in  cash  flow  sensitivity  does  not  affect  any  of  the  other  variables  except  for  the 
control variable size which is no longer significant.
25 However, consistent with our 
hypothesis, the cash flow sensitivity in high growth years, although still positive and 
significant, proves to be much smaller relative to its value in low growth years. In 
Panel A cash flow sensitivity drops from 1.3993 to 0.6097 between low and high 
growth periods, while Panel B shows a similar drop from 1.4419 to 0.6715. This 
implies that when growth opportunities are favorable, investment spending in unlisted 
companies is less dependent on the availability of internally generated funds. Turning 
to the long time listed firms, the interaction terms in Table 4 show that investment-
cash flow sensitivity is always significantly lower compared to the unlisted subgroup, 
and that furthermore its net impact is insignificant, in both high and low growth years. 
Also in line with our arguments, we find that for recent IPO firms the results are 
somewhat in between unlisted and long time listed companies. Similarly to unlisted 
firms, recent IPO companies show a decrease in cash flow sensitivity in periods of 
high growth opportunities where it even becomes insignificant. The resulting cash 
flow coefficient for recent IPOs in Panel A drops from a significantly positive value 
of 0.7674 when SG = 0 to an insignificant 0.2194 in high growth periods (a similar 
significant drop in cash flow sensitivity, from 0.8178 to -0,2819 can be found in Panel 
B). This indicates that while recent IPO firms are dependent on internally generated 
funds in periods of modest growth prospects, they are able to overcome this constraint 
                                                
25 The loss in significance of the size variable Lnta is due to the fact that larger non listed firms, in 
comparison to smaller ones, continue to invest more during low growth years. By splitting up the cash 
flow variable according to growth opportunities, this information gets absorbed in the interaction terms.  
Furthermore, in all models the coefficient of Lnta remains small economically. This is not surprising as 
our  sample  firms  are  all  large  companies.  Similarly  the  dummy  LnonIPO  may  change  from 
insignificant  to  significant  in  some  models.  However  likewise  Lnta,  its  coefficient  remains  small 
economically.   23 
in periods of favorable growth opportunities.
26 Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, 
there is  a possibility  that our results concerning  recent IPO  firms are affected by 
managerial discretion. Therefore, we will submit the model of Table 4 to a robustness 
check later on. 
 
In Table 5 we test our argument that, especially in situations of large information 
asymmetries and capital market imperfections, the importance of external financing 
for investment spending increases in high growth periods as these financing sources 
then tend to become more appealing. Table 5 retakes the model of Table 4 but now 
interacts  the  growth  dummy  (1-SG)  and  (SG)  with  the  external  financing  ratio 
( EF/K) in Panel A or the bank debt ratio ( BD/K) in Panel B. This operation has 
again  little  impact  on  the  coefficients  of  the  other  variables  in  the  investment 
equation. The result of the interaction between growth  and external financing  are 
consistent  with  our  earlier  argument  that  unlisted  firms  await  periods  of  good 
prospects to take on additional external financing. Panel A shows that the coefficient 
for  the  external  financing  ratio  ( EF/K)  for  unlisted  companies  is  positive  and 
significant only in high growth years (0.2940 when SG = 1). In low growth years (SG 
= 0), this coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The net effects at the 
bottom of Panel A show similar results for long time listed companies (0.0906 when 
SG  =  1)  and  recent  IPOs  (0.1668)  respectively.  The  coefficients  for  the  external 
financing  ratio  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero  for  both  types  of  listed 
companies when growth prospects are low (SG = 0). Our results are in line with 
Beattie  et  al.  (2006)  who  find,  using  survey  data  on  UK  companies, that  growth 
opportunities tend to dictate the amount of external financing. 
                                                
26 When we only consider the listed firms and replace sales growth with Tobin’s Q, our results remain 
very similar.   24 
As before, we re-estimate the model using the change in bank debt ratio instead of 
total external financing in Panel B. For unlisted companies the change in bank debt 
ratio ( BD/K) is only significant in high growth periods (0.7613 when SG = 1). For 
the publicly quoted companies, both recent IPO firms and long time listed, there are 
remarkable  differences  between  the   BD/K  (Panel  B)  and  the   EF/K  (Panel  A) 
models. The coefficient of the change in bank debt ratio is not significantly different 
from zero irrespective of the level of growth opportunities for the long time listed 
subgroup. For recent IPO firms however, the availability of bank debt tends to explain 
investment spending only in low growth years with a coefficient estimate of 0.5717. 
While results for recent IPO firms in Panel A indicate that  EF/K is only significant 
in high growth periods (SG = 1), the coefficient of  BD/K is then not statistically 
significant. This difference, together with the results for the univariate statistics in 
Table 2, suggests that for recent IPOs, equity financing dominates in high growth 
periods. Our findings are in line with Carpenter and Petersen (2002b) who show that 
equity is more suited in financing IPO companies with high growth opportunities. 
Overall, compared to unlisted firms, IPO firms seem to be able to almost entirely 
relax the restrictions of availability of internal financing and bank financing when 
growth opportunities are high. Long time listed firms can avoid these restrictions also 
in  periods  of  low  growth  as  they  suffer  less  from  information-related  market 
imperfections. 
***************************** 
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4.3. Robustness Issues 
In order to check whether our interpretations from Tables 3 and 4 concerning 
information-related financing constraints in recent IPO firms are valid, we submit 
these  models  to  robustness  testing.  While,  as  mentioned  before,  for  the  unlisted 
subgroup,  where  small  public  shareholders  are  absent,  it  is  hard  to  attribute  the 
positive  investment-cash  flow  sensitivity  to  agency  costs,  for  recent  IPO  firms 
sensitivity  could  also  indicate  free  cash  flow  problems  caused  by  the  conflict  of 
interest between insiders and small outside shareholders. Therefore, as an extra test 
we introduce the disciplining role of financial pressure in our investment equations.  
We re-estimate the investment models of Table 4 by replacing the growth dummy 
with a bank debt dummy (BD) which takes on the value 1 if a firm’s relative bank 
debt (total  bank debt divided  by total  assets)  is above its  subsample’s (long time 
listed, recent IPO or unlisted) median over the sample period and 0 otherwise. The 
free  cash  flow  theory  predicts  that  financial  pressure  imposes  disciplining  (e.g., 
Jensen, 1986; Nickell et al., 1997; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999), so that it should 
reduce cash flow sensitivity caused by over investment. In contrast, within financially 
constrained firms it is likely to exacerbate the financing problems and hence increase 
cash flow sensitivity. Results are reported in Table 6. 
 
***************************** 
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As  before,  Panel  A  contains  results  for  the  model  using  the  total  change  in 
external  financing  ratio  ( EF/K),  while  Panel  B  shows  the  results  for  the  model 
including only the change in bank debt ratio ( BD/K). Both Panels support the view 
that cash flow sensitivity of unlisted companies and recent IPOs can be explained by   26 
capital constraints as the investment-cash flow sensitivity increases for high levels of 
financial pressure. For the long time listed companies we find, in line with earlier 
results, no evidence of under investment nor over investment. 
As  a  second  and  alternative  robustness  test for  our  interpretations  we use  the 
methodology  of  Almeida  and  Campello  (2005)  concerning  the  substitution  effect 
between internal and external financing. These authors argue that when investments 
are constrained by capital market frictions, this substitution is weaker or even non 
existent compared to a situation of perfect markets with no frictions. On the basis of 
their reasoning we  would expect a strong  substitution effect  between internal and 
external financing for long time listed firms. For the unlisted companies, that are less 
able to shift towards external financing when internal cash falls short, we expect a 
much weaker or even no substitution effect. Finally, we expect the recent IPOs to be 
somewhere in between. In order to test these arguments we build a fixed effect model 
explaining either the change in total external financing ratio ( EF/K) or the change in 
bank debt ratio ( BD/K). The explanatory variables are - similar to Almeida and 
Campello  (2005)  -  the  remaining  variables  from  our  investment  models,   S/K, 
CF/K,  WC/K and lnta.
27 A significantly negative coefficient for the cash flow ratio 
would indicate a substitution effect between internal and external financing. In models 
that explain either ( EF/K) or ( BD/K), but do not include the SG dummy, we only 
find a significant substitution effect between internal and external financing for the 
listed companies (long time listed as well as recent IPOs). When we introduce the SG 
dummy, results are very analogous to our results of Table 5. In particular, for the 
models explaining the total change of external financing ( EF/K) we find significant 
substitution between internal and external financing in high growth periods (SG = 1) 
                                                
27 Results are not reported but available upon request.   27 
for  all  listed  firms.  In  fact,  a  substitution  effect  then  even  shows  for  unlisted 
companies  in  high  growth  periods,  although  much  weaker  and  only  marginally 
significant. The most interesting result occurs in the model explaining the change in 
bank debt ( BD/K). The model shows a substitution effect between internal financing 
and bank debt for unlisted companies only in high growth periods. For long time 
listed companies, the substitution effect only seems significant in low growth periods. 
Finally recent IPO-companies show substitution between cash flow and bank debt in 
both low and high growth periods. Overall, results from this alternative methodology 




In this paper we explore the impact of growth opportunities on investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. Within our sample of large Belgian firms we differentiate between 
levels of asymmetric information by considering large unlisted companies, recent IPO 
firms and long time listed firms. The introduction of unlisted companies contributes to 
the  existing  literature  that  considers  mainly  long  time  listed  companies,  thereby 
omitting those firms that are likely to suffer most from information-related financial 
market imperfections. Overall, we find strong support for our hypothesis that when 
information  asymmetries  are  important  the  measured  investment-cash  flow 
sensitivity, while remaining positive, significantly decreases in periods of high growth 
                                                
28 As an additional robustness check on our findings, we further extend the model of Almeida and 
Campello (2005) in order to test for the nature of the relationship between investment and external 
financing. We estimate a 2SLS system in which both the external financing model of Almeida and 
Campello  (2005)  and  our  basic  investment  equation  are  estimated  simultaneously.  The  system  is 
estimated  on  the  three  subsamples  of  interest,  unlisted  firms,  recent  IPOs  and  long  time  listed 
companies. Our results reveal that while investment ratios always have a significant positive impact on 
the change in external financing (or change in bank debt), the reverse causality only holds for unlisted 
firms and recent IPOs. In line with our earlier findings, long time listed companies show no signs of 
capital  constraints  and  their  investment  decisions  are  therefore  not  driven  by  the  availability  of 
financing sources (internal as well as external). Unlisted companies on the other hand suffer the most 
from these financial market imperfections and are strongly dependent on the availability of internal 
financing.   28 
opportunities, due to the timing of external financing usage. For firms operating under 
low  levels  of  asymmetric  information,  this  timing  does  not  seem  to  influence 
investment-cash  flow  sensitivity.  Our  results  add  insight  in  the  interpretation  of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity under severe information asymmetries when growth 
prospects are correlated with the use of external financing. 
In terms of policy implications, our results offer an explanation why in Belgium, 
and likely also other continental European countries, the bulk of large firms remain 
unlisted. Specifically, except for possibly increased financial flexibility, our long time 
listed sample firms seem to have no need for extra financing opportunities offered by 
the stock market.
29 This raises questions either about the growth opportunities of these 
firms or about the functioning of the stock market. In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
as well as practitioners (e.g., Daems, 1999), argue that an insider oriented system with 
large owners may, next to limiting agency problems, also impose costs on the firm if 
these block holders oppose important strategic investments in order to avoid seasoned 
offerings and hence dilution of ownership.
30 Such a policy my create the impression 
of  absence  of  capital  constraints,  if  there  is  sufficient  funding  for  day  to  day 
investment  needs.  Finally  our  research  shows  that  even  for  large  companies  the 
availability  of  bank  financing  at  a  reasonable  cost  is  an  important  condition  for 
corporate investment. This implies that in periods of monetary tightening not only the 
investment  behavior  of  small  companies  but  also  that  of  large  well  established 
unlisted companies will be influenced. In view of the economic importance of the set 
                                                
29  The  fact  that  in  most  Continental  European  countries  also  unlisted  firms  have  to  publish  their 
financial statements creates  opportunities for comparison and higher quality evaluation by  lenders. 
Hence  the  mandatory  publication  also  helps  to  decrease  problems  of  asymmetric  information  for 
private firms, and therefore is also favorable to these firms remaining unlisted. 
30 Because  of  the  often  voiced  problem among  practitioners that  due  to  the lack  of anti  takeover 
devices, the wish to keep control and firm growth may be conflicting objectives, the Belgian institute 
for corporate governance has recently launched a proposal to change the Belgian corporate law to allow 
multiple voting shares, next to single voting stock.   29 
of large unlisted firms, this finding predicts an important impact of monetary policy 
on aggregate capital expenditures. 
 
Appendix 
Description of Variables 
Variable measure  Description 
 
Investment ratio 
   (I/K) 
 
Sales growth ratio 
   ( S/K) 
 
Cash flow ratio 
   (CF/K) 
 
  Working capital ratio 
   ( WC/K) 
 
  Bank debt ratio 
   ( BD/K) 
 
  External financing ratio 










(Fixed tangible assets)t – (Fixed tangible assets)t-1 +Depreciations 
(Fixed tangible assets)t-1 
 
Salest – Salest-1 
(Fixed tangible assets)t-1 
 
(EBITDA – interests paid – taxes)t 
(Fixed tangible assets)t-1 
 
(Net Working capital)t – (Net Working capital)t-1 
(Fixed tangible assets)t-1 
 
(Total Bank debt)t –(Total Bank debt)t-1 
(Fixed tangible assets)t-1 
 
(Book value debt+paid in capital)t – (Book value debt+paid in capital)t-1 




Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is listed in a particular year and did not go 
public 3 years ago or less; 0 otherwise 
Dymmy variable: 1 if the firm is listed in a particular year and did go 
public 3 years ago or less; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if sales growth in a particular year is higher than the 
subsample median (unlisted, long time listed or recent IPO) over the 
sample period; 0 otherwise 
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Table 1 
Sample Composition and Industry Distribution 
  Panel A 
Year  All Firms  Unlisted  Listed 
1993  159  122  37 
1994  154  117  37 
1995  128  98  30 
1996  107  77  30 
1997  153  110  43 
1998  172  120  52 
1999  205  143  62 
2000  218  149  69 
2001  250  181  69 
2002  275  203  72 
2003  219  152  66 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Summary statistics Panel A 













2<>3    3<>4 
Mean  0.310  0.297  0.306  0.419  0.71  0.00  Investment ratio 
   (I/K)  Median  0.221  0.204  0.225  0.354  0.52   0.00  
Mean  0.396  0.279  0.458  0.827  0.21  0.01  Sales growth ratio 
   ( S/K)  Median  0.091  0.083  0.044  0.272  0.62   0.00  
Mean  0.393  0.374  0.409  0.506  0.20  0.06  Cash flow ratio 
   (CF/K)  Median  0.282  0.280  0.271  0.356  0.25   0.03  
Mean  0.054  0.044  0.036  0.176  0.88  0.20    Working capital 
ratio   ( WC/K)  Median  0.016  0.019  0.007  0.031  0.46   0.31  
Mean  0.044  0.031  0.071  0.083  0.24  0.83    Bank debt ratio 
   ( BD/K)  Median  -0.002  -0.009  0.000  0.000  0.05   0.72  
Mean  0.112  0.045  0.162  0.571  0.22  0.01    External 
financing ratio 
( EF/K)  Median  0.012  -0.011  0.045  0.195  0.03   0.00  
Mean  11.627  11.373  12.420  11.959  0.00  0.00  Size 
   (Lnta)  Median  11.406  11.192  12.245  11.953  0.00  0.00 
 
Summary statistics Panel B 
Low growth years (SG = 0) 












2<>3    3<>4 
Mean  0.226  0.220  0.223  0.272  0.90  0.11  Investment ratio 
(I/K)  Median  0.169  0.162  0.179  0.198  0.56  0.07 
Mean  -0.037  -0.075  0.067  -0.012  0.04  0.06    Bank debt ratio 
( BD/K)  Median  -0.031  -0.043  0.001  -0.015  0.00  0.03 
Mean  -0.110  -0.167  0.047  0.000  0.01  0.78    External financing 
ratio   ( EF/K)  Median  -0.077  -0.099  -0.012  -0.004  0.00  0.96 
High growth years (SG = 1) 












2<>3    3<>4 
Mean  0.396  0.374  0.410  0.480  0.35  0.02  Investment ratio 
(I/K)  Median  0.289  0.263  0.306  0.409  0.17  0.00 
Mean  0.101  0.146  0.077  0.220  0.69  0.08    Bank debt ratio 
( BD/K)  Median  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.058  0.84  0.02 
Mean  0.336  0.253  0.300  1.060  0.79  0.00    External financing 
ratio   ( EF/K)  Median  0.135  0.104  0.099  0.470  0.79  0.00 
Notes: For Panels A and B the corresponding p-values for the F-test statistic for the means test and the 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Z-statistic for the median test are given in the respective rows. Differences 
between mean and median are only tested between unlisted and long time listed (2<>3) and between 
long time listed and recent IPO (3<>4) respectively. Variables are defined in Subsection 3.2 and the 
appendix.   35 
Table 3 
Stock Listing and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 

















 EF/K  0.0878*** 
(14.83)  - 
 BD/K  -  0.4169*** 
(7.59) 




















Sargan  0.408  0.629 
m1  -8.24  -12.18 
m2  -1.13  0.17 
Net effect 
(Wald coeff test)  Value  Value 
 











Notes:  The  dependent  variable  in  all  models  is  the  investment  ratio  (I/K), 
explanatory variables are defined in Subsection 3.2 and the appendix. Models 
are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses). 
The  validity  of  using  lagged  values  from  t-2  and  before  of  endogenous 
regressors as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The 
Sargan test is c 
2 distributed, its p-values are reported in the Table. We calculate 
the significance of the net effect of a variable X on the investment ratio of listed 
companies (either LnonIPO or LIPO) by applying a Wald coefficient test to the 
form (1+L)*X = 0. The results from these tests (F-statistics in parentheses) are 
reported at the bottom of the Table. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   36 
Table 4 
Growth Opportunities and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 





















 EF/K  0.0885*** 
(10.16)  - 
 BD/K  -  0.4446*** 
(9.55) 




























Sargan test  0.402  0.324 
m1  -8.34  -11.90 
m2  -1.25  0.22 
Net effect 
(Wald coeff test) 
  Value 
















Notes:  The  dependent  variable  in  all  models  is  the  investment  ratio  (I/K), 
explanatory  variables  are  defined  in  Subsection  3.2  and  the  appendix.  The 
coefficient  for  the  cash  flow  ratio  is  split  based  on  the  growth  opportunity 
dummy (SG). Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistics in parentheses). The validity of using lagged values from t-2 and before 
of endogenous regressors as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals 
m1 and m2. The Sargan test is c 
2 distributed, its p-values are reported in the 
Table. We calculate the significance of the net effect of a variable X on the 
investment ratio of listed companies (either LnonIPO or LIPO) by applying a 
Wald coefficient test to the form (1+L)*X = 0. The results from these tests (F-
statistics  in  parentheses)  are  reported  at  the  bottom  of  the  Table.  Level  of 
significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   37 
Table 5 
Growth Opportunities and External Financing 











CF/K  0.4895*** 
(5.52) 
CF/K  0.5926*** 
(5.17) 
 WC/K  -0.0414* 
(-1.62) 
 WC/K  -0.1110** 
(-2.44) 
(1-SG)* EF/K  -0.0971 
(-1.25.) 
(1-SG)* BD/K  0.0110 
(0.08) 
SG* EF/K  0.2940*** 
(9.91) 
SG* BD/K  0.7613*** 
(6.72) 
Lnta  0.0415** 
(2.49) 
lnta  0.0671*** 
(5.66) 
LnonIPO  0.0428*** 
(2.63) 
LnonIPO  0.0093 
(0.20) 
LIPO  0.0590*** 
(2.78) 
LIPO  0.1647** 
(2.15) 
(1-SG)*LnonIPO* EF/K  0.0988** 
(2.22) 
(1-SG)*LnonIPO* BD/K  0.3121* 
(1.64) 
(SG)*LnonIPO* EF/K  -0.2034*** 
(-6.35) 
(SG)*LnonIPO* BD/K  -0.6831* 
(-1.70) 
(1-SG)*LIPO* EF/K  0.0646 
(0.63) 
(1-SG)*LIPO* BD/K  0.5607 
(1.29) 
(SG)*LIPO* EF/K  -0.1271 
(-1.31) 
(SG)*LIPO* BD/K  -0.6118*** 
(-3.18.) 
Sargan test  0.181  Sargan test  0.862 
m1  -13.05  m1  -11.09 
m2  -0.41  m2  -0.08. 
Net effect 
(Wald coeff. test) 
  Net effect 
(Wald coeff. test)  Value 
















(1-SG)*  EF/K *(1+LIPO)  0.0325 
(0.12) 




(SG)*  EF/K *(1+LIPO)  0.1668* 
(3.48) 
(SG)*  BD/K *(1+LIPO)  0.1495 
(0.61) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the investment ratio (I/K), explanatory variables are 
defined in Subsection 3.2 and the appendix. The coefficient for the external financing ratio (Panel A) 
or the bank debt ratio (Panel B) is split based on the growth opportunity dummy (SG). Models are 
tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method (White's 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses). The validity of using lagged values from t-2 
and  before  of  endogenous  regressors  as  instruments  was  evaluated  with  the  Sargan  test  of  over-
identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The Sargan test 
is c 
2 distributed, its p-values are reported in the Table. We calculate the significance of the net effect 
of a variable X on the investment ratio of listed companies (either LnonIPO or LIPO) by applying a 
Wald coefficient test to the form (1+L)*X = 0. The results from these tests (F-statistics in parentheses) 
are reported at the bottom of the Table. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 

























 EF/K  0.0944*** 
(20.35)  - 
 BD/K  -  0.4029*** 
(12.89) 




























Sargan test  0.242  0.603 
m1  -9.79  -10.93 
m2  -0.07  0.42 
Net effect 
(Wald coeff test)  Value  Value 
















Notes:  The  dependent  variable  in  all  models  is  the  investment  ratio  (I/K), 
explanatory  variables  are  defined  in  Subsection  3.2  and  the  appendix.  The 
coefficient for the cash flow ratio is split based on the financial pressure dummy 
(BD).  Models are  tested with  GMM,  estimated  in  first  differences  using  the 
Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  method  (White's  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-
statistics in parentheses). The validity of using lagged values from t-2 and before 
of endogenous regressors as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals 
m1 and m2. The Sargan test is c 
2 distributed, its p-values are reported in the 
Table. We calculate the significance of the net effect of a variable X on the 
investment ratio of listed companies (either LnonIPO or LIPO) by applying a 
Wald coefficient test to the form (1+L)*X = 0. The results from these tests (F-
statistics  in  parentheses)  are  reported  at  the  bottom  of  the  Table.  Level  of 
significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   39 
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